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AIRPORT NOISE LITIGATION: CASE LAW
REVIEW
RICARDA L. BENNETT*
AIRPORT NOISE LITIGATION: CASE LAW ANALYSIS
A IRCRAFT NOISE law is slowly evolving through judicial
interpretation and legislative enactment. The struggle be-
tween simultaneously maintaining the power to control air-
craft noise and avoiding the responsiblity for damages caused
by noise, presents a dilemma that causes confusion among va-
rious governmental authorities and private entities. The
courts, in their attempt to interrelate the maze of competing
social, economic and governmental objectives, have focused on
the airport proprietor's authority and the methods through
which to control airport noise. Their decisions have set some
legal precedents and have created a multitude of unfilled ex-
pectations. Therefore, prior to the promulgation of more legis-
lation, it is advisable to gain some historical perspective on
the judicial trends in airport noise litigation. This perspective
can be obtained by examining cases decided since the 1973
Supreme Court airport noise decision, City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.'
This article focuses on legislation only as it impacts the va-
rious judicial decisions. The emphasis is on the analysis of fac-
tual situations and judicial decisions. These cases define the
* B.S. California State University-Northridge; J.D. University of San Fernando,
College of Law. Ms. Bennett currently practices law in Santa Monica, California. She
was a consultant in aircraft noise at Bolt, Beranek & Newman, Inc. and is now associ-
ated with Heliport Consultants in Los Angeles, California.
411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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predominent issues arising out of the conflict between control
of the source of aircraft noise and liability for aircraft noise-
related damages.
The significant issues in the various aircraft/airport noise
cases analyzed in this article can be organized under four
topic headings that track the judicial progress in the area of
airport noise litigation:
I. Which governmental or private entity have the courts
historically held responsible for aircraft noise-related
damages?
II. What is the scope of the airport proprietary and the non-
proprietary use restrictions?
III. What are the current legal theories and trends in award-
ing aircraft noise-related damages?
IV. What are the effects of land use planning and environ-
mental impact statements on airport noise control?
I. WHO Is LIABLE?
The issue of which governmental or private entity will carry
the financial burden for aircraft noise-related damages is ar-
gued in conjunction with the issue of who controls the noise
source causing the damage. While the federal government pro-
fesses to have the sole right to control the use and manage-
ment of airspace, and the aircraft noise source, it has declined
responsibility for injury to persons or property caused by air-
craft noise. For the most part, the plaintiffs and courts have
looked to airport proprietors for monetary compensation.
These airport proprietors have argued that, lacking control of
the noise source, they should be absolved from responsibility
for aircraft noise-related damages. They have pointed to the
airplane manufacturers as the responsible parties, based on
the failure to produce a "quiet" airplane, and to the federal
government, based on enactment of legislation preempting
noise source and airspace management.
The Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Allegheny
County2 set the standard for subjecting the airport proprietor
2 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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to responsibility and concomitant financial liability for air-
craft noise-related damages. In Griggs, Mr. Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, held the local county government re-
sponsible, as owner-operator of the airport, because the
county had the authority to acquire adequate land adjacent to
the airport.' The county was liable in damages to the plaintiff
landowner who had been deprived of the use and enjoyment
of his property by direct aircraft overflight.4 The local govern-
ment, as the airport proprietor, and not the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), had established an avigational ease-
ment over Mr. Griggs' property by reason of the direct air-
craft overflights.5 This action had substantially deprived Mr.
Griggs of the use and enjoyment of his property without just
compensation. Thus, it was the governmental airport proprie-
tor, and not the FAA, who was liable for compensatory
damages.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Black disagreed with this conclu-
sion.7 He argued that the FAA, as an agency of the federal
goverment, had supervised, approved, and in large part paid
for the airport construction." He reasoned that the federal
government should have assumed the financial responsibility
because Congress had initiated a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that not only preempted the airspace at high alti-
tudes, but also restricted the low altitude airspace necessary
for the takeoff and approach to airports.9
Congress, however, has endorsed the majority position of
Mr. Justice Douglas in Griggs, and has enacted legislation to
clarify this area of primary authority. The Noise Control Act
of 197210 emphasized that federal action is essential to deal
with "major noise sources in commerce, control of which re-
,3 Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 86-87, 90.
Id. at 89-90.
oId.
7 Id. at 91.
8 Id. at 91-92, 94.
9 Id. at 92.
10 Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1972 &
Supp. 1981)).
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quires national uniformity of treatment."1 But, ultimately,
Congress intended that "the primary responsibility for control
of noise rests with State and local governments.'" Other leg-
islation, regulations, and policy statements stress that the
responsiblility of noise control rests with the airport proprie-
tor: the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, and
1976 and 1981 amendments;" the Aviation Noise Abatement
Policy of 1976;14 the Airlines Deregulation Act of 1978;16 the
Id. § 4901(a)(3).
"Id. The intent of Congress to maintain a shared responsibility for aircraft noise
control between the federal and local governments is evident in the congressional de-
liberations. See S. REP. No. 1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. REP. No. 842, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); 118 CONG. Rsc. (daily eds. Feb. 29, Oct. 12, Oct. 13, and Oct.
18, 1972). For example, in S. RaP. No. 1160, the comments are that the:
States and local governments are preempted from establishing or en-
forcing noise emission standards for aircraft unless such standards are
identical to standards prescribed under this bill. This does not address
responsibilities or powers of airport operators, and no provision of the
bill is intended to alter in any way the relationship between the au-
thority of the Federal government and that of State and local govern-
ments that existed with respect to matters covered by section 611 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 prior to the enactment of the bill.
S. REP. No. 1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972).
13 49 U.S.C. § 1701 (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-353 (1976) and Pub. L.
No. 97-35 (1981). The Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, as amended in
1976 (the Act), authorizes and directs the FAA to fund airport development and
planning. The Act provides, among other things, that funds will not be granted for
the airport development project unless the airport proprietor has given fair considera-
tion to the interests of the communities in or near where an airport development may
be located. This implies a requirement to consider the effects of the airport on the
health and welfare of the community. Id. §§ 1712(f), 1716(f).
14 Aviation Noise Abatement Policy of 1976, U.S. Dept. of Transportation (Nov.
18, 1976) [hereinafter cited as DOT/FAA Aviation Noise Abatement Policy]. This
policy statement was jointly issued by the Department of Transportation and the
Federal Aviation Administration in an effort to define the various responsibilities of
federal, state, and local governments concerning airport noise abatement. The report
focused upon federal funding for airport noise control planning grants, and also out-
lined a variety of noise abatement actions airport proprietors could employ in their
abatement plans. A section of the report which analyzed the legal responsibilities of
the various parties with regard to the noise control issue, commented that the author-
ity of an airport operator "to control what types of aircraft use its airport, to impose
curfews or other use restrictions, and, subject to FAA approval, to regulate runway
use and flight paths" was not preempted. Id. at 34.
16 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a), (b) (Supp. 111978). The
Airline Deregulation Act provides that the federal government preempts any state,
political subdivision, or interstate agency in enacting or enforcing any law, rule, or
regulation relating to rates, routes, or services of any interstate air carriers. It also,
however, acknowledges that nothing under the preemption section should be con-
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Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979;16 and the
Airport Noise Compatibility Planning Regulations of 1981.17
The legislative history' s of the 1968 addition of section 611
to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was examined by Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas in the body of the Griggs opinion, and further
scrutinized in the oft quoted Footnote 14 of Burbank.1' This
legislative history consisted of a letter from then Secretary of
Transportation Boyd to the Senate Commerce Committee re-
viewing the proposed legislation. In the letter, Boyd stressed
that the proposed legislation would not affect the rights of a
state or local public agency, as the proprietor of an airport, to
issue nondiscriminatory noise control regulations.20 Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas concluded in Burbank, that the non-proprietor
municipality was preempted by federal legislation from im-
strued to limit the proprietary powers of the various governmental agencies as the
owner or operator of an airport.
" Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-2108,
2121-2125 (West Supp. 1982). After an airport proprietor has submitted an aircraft
noise abatement plan to the Secretary of Transportation, the proprietor may, with
FAA approval, implement measures that include the use of flight procedures to con-
trol the operation of aircraft to reduce exposure of individuals to noise in the area
surrounding the airport. Id. § 2104(a)(4).
17 14 C.F.R. § 150 (1981).
's 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1976). Part of the legislative history is contained in S. Rzp. No.
1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968). The Senate Report stated that the bill is an
amendment to a statute describing the powers and duties of the federal government
with respect to air commerce. It also noted:
It is not the intent of the committee in recommending this legislation
to effect any change in the existing apportionment of powers between
the Federal and State and local governments.. . . "The Federal Gov-
ernment is in no position to require an airport to accept service by
larger aircraft and, for that purpose, to obtain longer runways. Like-
wise, the Federal Government is in no position to require an airport to
accept service by noisier aircraft, and for that purpose to obtain addi-
tional noise easements. The issue is the service desired by the airport
owner and the steps it is willing to take to obtain the service. In deal-
ing with this issue, the Federal Government should not substitute its
judgment for that of the States or elements of the local government
who, for the most part, own and operate our Nation's airports. The
proposed legislation is not designed to do this and will not prevent
airport proprietors from excluding any aircraft on the basis of noise
considerations."
Id. (quoting in part a letter written by the Secretary of Transportation to the Com-
mitte on Commerce, dated June 22, 1968).
19 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 635 n.14 (1973).
I ld. at 635-36.
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posing a curfew on airport operations.2 1 At the same time, he
left open the question of how much authority a municipality
as airport proprietor had to control these very same airport/
aircraft operations.2 2
A three judge district court, in Air Transport Association v.
Crotti,2 8 acknowledged the pervasive power of the federal gov-
ernment under the Supremacy Clause,24 but ruled that the
airport proprietor, who is liable for the consequences of air-
port operations, had the right to control the use of the airport
at his own initiative or at the direction of the state. Moreover,
this concept of proprietary control included "the basic right to
determine the type of air service a given airport proprietor
wants his or her facilities to provide, as well as the type of
aircraft to utilize those facilities . . Proprietorship con-
trol is outside the scope of federal preemption, according to
the court's rather liberal interpretation of Footnote 14 in the
Burbank opinion. There were, however, certain aspects of the
California regulatory scheme that were disallowed on the
ground of preemption, such as the imposition of sanctions on
aircraft for exceeding a noise level measured by the single
event noise exposure level (SENEL)2 6
District Judge Peckham, in National Aviation v. City of
Hayward7 reached the same conclusion as the Crotti court on
the issue of federal preemption of proprietary regulations-in
this case a noise-related night curfew imposed by a municipal
airport proprietor. Judge Peckam refused to base his conclu-
sions on Footnote 14 of Burbank, but instead focused on the
Congressional intent not to interfere with the proprietor's
powers to control airport noise levels.2 He emphasized that
both Congress and the FAA had the power to enact legislation
providing a uniform system of federal regulations, but since
Id. at 638-39.
I ld. at 636 n.14.
13 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
389 F. Supp. at 64.
Id. at 65.
" 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
28 Id. at 421 (citing S. REp. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968)).
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"at the present time, Congress and the FAA do not appear to
have preempted the area then the City of Hayward, as propri-
etor of Hayward Air Terminal, cannot be enjoined from en-
forcing ordinance 75-023 C.S. on preemption grounds."2
The issues of federal preemptory powers under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and airport proprietary
rights to determine noise exposure by controlling airport oper-
ations were thoroughly litigated in British Airways Board v.
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.80 The trial and
appellate courts were forced to decide a controversial and de-
cidedly political issue: whether the supersonic Concorde
should be allowed to conduct test flights into New York's
John F. Kennedy (JFK) Airport. After two rounds at the fed-
eral district court level, and the accompanying appellate deci-
sions, the Concorde was allowed to operate out of JFK. The
basis of the decision was not preemption by federal control of
aircraft flight operations, nor the order of William T. Cole-
man, Secretary of Transportation,- but rather the Port Au-
" 418 F. Supp. at 425.
so 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y.) (Concorde I), rev'd, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), on re-
mand, 437 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.) (Concorde II), afl'd, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
In response to Secretary of Transportation William T. Coleman's announcement on
February 4, 1976, that the Anglo-French Concorde SST had permission to land at
Dulles International Airport (Dulles) outside of Washington, D.C., and at John F.
Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York City, the Port Authorities of the
respective airports on March 11, 1976 denied the Concorde landing rights pending
further study of the airplane's potential noise effects on the surrounding communities
near JFK. Not willing to lose another revolution, the British Airways Board and
Compaguie Nationale Air France (British Airways and Air France), the operators of
the Concorde, sought injunctive relief alleging that the Port Authority's power to act
in the area of airport noise regulation had been preempted by the federal govern-
ment, and specifically preempted by Secretary Coleman's decision regarding the land-
ing rights. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, reversing the District Court
for the Southern District of New York, held that the Port Authority was not pre-
empted from banning the Concorde. 558 F.2d at 78-82. The appellate court did not
stop there, but remanded the case to the district court for determination of whether
or not the Port Authority's 13-month delay in formulating a noise regulation for the
Concorde was unreasonable, and whether such a delay was discriminatory and an
undue burden on commerce. The subsequent decisions were referred to as Concorde
I. The district court examined the issues and decided that the Port Authority had
the power to regulate the airplane noise, but that the undue delay in promulgating
such a regulation was discriminatory. 437 F. Supp. 804, 818 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 564
F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
, The Secretary's Decision on Concorde Supersonic Transport, February 4, 1976,
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thority's abdication of its responsibility in failing to establish
fair regulations for the Concorde flights within a reasonable
time period.32
Chief Judge Irving Kaufman, in the final Concorde II ap-
pellate decision, affirmed the airport proprietor's power to
regulate noise levels." He concurred with Judge Pollack, who
wrote the second district court decision, and stressed that air-
port operator's noise regulations must be "reasonable, nonar-
bitrary and nondiscriminatory." 8
In the first trial (Concorde 1), at the district court level,
Judge Pollack decided that the local Port Authority's regula-
tions banning the Concorde operations should fail because
they conflicted with federal administrative orders issued by
the then Secretary of Transportation Coleman." Judge Pol-
lack concluded that the "policy of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) in allowing airport proprietors to impose
use restrictions pertinent to the perceived local noise problem
is a delegated authority, reviewable by and subject to the
overriding control of federal authority when exercised." ' In
Concorde I, it was exercised by Secretary of Transportation
Coleman.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
under Chief Judge Irving Kaufman, quickly perceived the im-
plications of the lower court ruling which opened up possibili-
ties of shifting financial responsibility to the federal govern-
ment. Kaufman reversed the decision as "simply untenable
reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation - Current and Proposed Federal Policy in the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 567-631 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Secretary's Decision). On February 4, 1976, Secretary of Transportation Wil-
liam T. Coleman, Jr., issued a report which granted provisional authorization for the
Concorde SST to land at selected airports in the United States. A more comprehen-
sive analysis of the Coleman Report can be found in Donen, British Airways v. Port
Authority: Its Impact on Aircraft Noise Regulation, 43 J. Aia L. & COM. 691 (1978).
2 437 F. Supp. 804, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
" British Airways Board v. Port Authority, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1002.
" 431 F. Supp. 1216, 1225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See supra note 31 and accompany-
ing text.
11 431 F. Supp. at 1222 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976)).
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and erroneous. '- 7 Judge Kaufman cited the federal govern-
ment's amicus curae brief, which raised for the first time on
appeal the issue of the reasonableness of the Port Authority's
delay3 s He also examined statements by Secretary of Trans-
portation Adams, former Secretary Coleman, and President
Carter, who unanimously agreed that Coleman's Order did not
preempt the Port Authority's right to exclude the Concorde,
pursuant to a reasonable, nondiscriminatory noise regula-
tion.39 Once again the policies enumerated under Grigg840 and
implied in Burbank41 were upheld, thus reaffirming that the
authority to restrict noisy aircraft, along with the concomitant
liability for damages, were the responsibility of the airport
proprietor.
The case was then remanded to the federal district court
under Judge Pollack.41 In Concorde II, Judge Pollack dis-
solved the ban on Concorde test flights and concluded from
the evidence that the Port Authority, by its inaction, had no
intention of taking the responsibility of setting noise stan-
dards applicable to the Concorde.43 He stressed that the sev-
enteen month delay in determining applicable noise regula-
tions was "unreasonable, discriminatory and unfair and an
impingement on commerce and on national and international
interests of the United States.'"4 Thus, while the Port Au-
thority had the power to establish acceptable noise rules, it
forfeited its privilege to regulate the Concorde by its unrea-
sonable delay.45
The Port Authority appealed this decision, and Concorde II
went back before the three judge panel headed by Judge
Kaufman.4 In this final appellate decision, Judge Kaufman
87 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977). The court remanded for an evidentiary hearing to
determine the reasonableness of the Port Authority's 13 month ban.
38 Id. at 82.
" Id. at 81.
40 369 U.S. 84 (1962). See supra text accompanying note 2.
41 411 U.S. 624 (1973). See supra text accompanying note 1.
"2 British Airways Board v. Port Authority, 437 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
41 Id. at 818.
44 Id.
45 Id.
4' British Airways Board v. Port Authority, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
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affirmed, emphasizing that the Port Authority could not "stall
when all the information at its disposal either confirms the
SST's ability to meet existing noise rules or is impotent to
dissuade other responsible officials that the impact of Con-
corde's low frequency energy emissions on airport neighbors
will not be more than minimal at most."4 7
Airport proprietors are not entirely satisfied with the dis-
tinction of having sole financial responsibility for damages
arising from noisy aircraft. They have tried on several occa-
sions to share the fame and frustration with other parties, no-
tably the airplane manufacturers. In City of Los Angeles v.
Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd.,"5 the city, as owner-proprietor of
the Los Angeles International Airport, attempted to obtain
equitable or contractual indemnification from the air carriers,
two jet airframe manufacturers and two jet engine manufac-
turers, as reimbursement from an inverse condemnation suit
held against the city. The California court reasoned that the
air carriers were not authorized under the California Code of
Civil Procedure to exercise the right of eminent domain to the
airspace over or adjacent to Los Angeles International Air-
port.4" The California Code of Civil Procedure, section 1239.3,
specifically provided that air easements may be acquired by a
county, city, port district, or airport district if such "taking" is
necessary. 0 Additionally, in the leasing agreements entered
into by the air carriers with the municipal airport proprietor,
,1 Id. at 1012.
4' 41 Cal. App. 3d 416, 116 Cal. Rptr. 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
'9 Id. at 428, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
80 Id. at 427, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 77 (citing CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1239.3 (West 1965)
(repealed 1976)). California Civil Code section 1001 pertains to acquisition of prop-
erty by eminent domain and stated, in part, that "[a]ny person may, without further
legislative action, acquire private property for any use specified in section 1238 of the
Code of Civil Procedure." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1001 (West 1954) (repealed 1976). Section
1238, subdivision 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies airport use as a use for
which property may be so acquired. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1238(20) (West 1954)
(repealed 1976). However, the Code of Civil Procedure section 1239.3 contains a limi-
tation on who can acquire title to the airspace above the surface of property or an
easement in such airspace. The Code specifies that only a county, city, port authority,
or airport district is authorized to "take" if necessary to prevent the loss of use and
enjoyment of real property in the vicinity of the airport. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §
1239.3 (West 1966) (repealed 1976).
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there was no indication that the parties intended the airlines
to indemnify the city for using flight paths in the manner con-
templated by and provided for in the lease. 1 Therefore, with-
out the eminent domain mandate or any contractual liability,
the air carriers did not have to indemnify the city. The city,
as owner/proprietor, was solely liable for the noise-related
damages.2
Wisconsin property owners in Luedtke v. County of Mil-
waukee," attempted to hold the county, as airport proprietor,
and five federally certified airlines liable for taking their prop-
erty through an avigation servitude. The plaintiff property
owners charged the defendants with negligence, creating a
nuisance, and violating a Wisconsin statute dealing with lia-
bility for low altitude, dangerous or damage-causing flights."
The plaintiffs maintained that the defendants had subjected
their property to an avigational easement without just com-
pensation and, therefore, violated the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution." The court
dismissed the fifth amendment charges against all the defen-
dants, holding that there was no taking by the federal govern-
ment.56 The court also dismissed the fourteenth amendment
cause of action against the airlines. The court acknowledged
that the flight of the aircraft over land might cause a "taking"
of the subject property, but ruled that the plaintiffs had to
look to the county, which by its creation and operation of the
airport, should be held responsible.5 7 The district court ex-
pressly rejected the contention that the airlines, whose opera-
5' 49 Cal. App. 3d at 429, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
Id. at 431, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
" 371 F. Supp. 1040 (E.D. Wis. 1974), affd in part and vacated and remanded in
part on other grounds, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975).
" 371 F. Supp. at 1040. The Wisconsin statute which the plaintiffs claimed was
violated, made it unlawful, among other things, for an aircraft to fly "at such a low
altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to which the land or water, or the
space over land or water, is put by the owner . . . ." 521 F.2d 387 at 391 (quoting
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 114.04 (West 1974)).
" 521 F.2d at 389.
Id. The court stated that the fifth amendment did not apply to actions by state
agencies or private parties. Id.
67 Id.
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tions were authorized by federal regulations, could be held lia-
ble to the plaintiffs." The court concluded that an inverse
condemnation claim against the county, as the airport propri-
etor, was the proper cause of action. The district court,
therefore, dismissed the fourteenth amendment claim against
the county on the ground that the plaintiff had instituted
these proceedings in a state court, in which monetary damages
were recoverable."
The City of Los Angeles, in Aaron v. City of Los Angeles,6
in an effort to avoid liability, argued that airplanes were the
proximate cause of the noise and, therefore, the federal gov-
ernment, which regulates the flight in navigable airspace,
should be liable for the damages.2 The court ruled, however,
that, while the federal government exerts some control over
navigable airspace, this did not immunize the city, as the air-
port proprietor, for failure to appropriate, by eminent domain
or otherwise, the land and airspace necessary to provide for
adequate aircraft approaches."
The State of Illinois brought an action in federal district
court in State of Illinois v. Butterfield," against two agencies
of the federal government, the FAA and the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), and their chief administrators. The state sought
relief from the substantial increase in aircraft operations,
noise pollution and air pollution at O'Hare International Air-
port. The suit charged that the FAA's policy of unlimited
growth at O'Hare, its authority to approve flight paths, and
the resulting pattern of aircraft operations constituted federal
action affecting the quality of the environment and, therefore,
required that an environmental impact statement (EIS) be
58 371 F. Supp. at 1043. In this case, the airlines were governed by the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, as amended. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
89 521 F.2d at 389. The court noted that the plaintiff did not allege that the airlines
had violated any federal laws or regulations. Id.
" Id. at 390.
61 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1122 (1975).
1, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 487, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 173.
68 Id.
396 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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prepared by the FAA and CAB,65 pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).ee The district
court agreed with the plaintiff's contentions that the FAA and
CAB should be compelled to file an EIS before continuing to
increase aircraft traffic and operations at O'Hare. The court
noted that the EIS should be done, even though the airport
was already very busy prior to the enactment of NEPA.
7
The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants (FAA and
CAB) failed to utilize existing technological advancements
with regards to controlling aircraft noise and air pollution
emissions. This failure resulted in "inflicting injury on persons
and property in the neighborhood of O'Hare and creating a
nuisance in the State of Illinois." 68 The plaintiffs, who wanted
to hold the FAA and CAB liable, argued that the Griggs case 9
was no longer valid because the Federal Aviation Act of 195870
had created a structure which provided for total federal con-
trol over the routing of commercial air carriers and over the
design of aircraft and airports.7 1 The court, however, followed
the holding in Griggs and ruled that the City of Chicago, as
owner-operator of O'Hare, not the FAA or the CAB, was the
only proper defendant in the action.72
Three other cases in recent years have dealt with the con-
cept of responsibility for property loss due to avigational ease-
ments arising from aircraft overflights. First, in Alevizos v.
65 Id. at 635. The state also claimed that the FAA failed to comply with the Ad-
ministative Procedure Act, and that the defendants had created a nuisance in Illinois.
Id. at 636.
"6 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), Pub L. No. 91-190
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4331-4335, 4341-4347, 4361-4370 (West 1977
& Supp. 1982)), outlines a formal procedure in which the effects of noise on the sur-
rounding communities are balanced against suggested air traffic regulatory decisions.
Section 102 of NEPA directs (1) that the policies, regulations and public laws of the
United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the broad
policies of that Act and (2) that all federal agencies furnish a detailed statement of
the environmental impacts of "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quali-
ty of the human environment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(c) (West 1977).
67 396 F. Supp. at 640.
Id. at 643.
Griggs v. Allegheny Co., 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
0 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (Supp. 1979).
71 396 F. Supp. at 644.
72 Id.
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Metropolitan Airports Commission of Minneapolis and St.
Paul (MAC),78 the court held that the property owners could
bring inverse condemnation proceedings against MAC to ob-
tain compensation for the acquisition by MAC of avigational
easements over their property. The court reasoned that be-
cause MAC had the power necessary to operate and manage
the airports, by implication it also had the power to acquire
avigational easements in order to carry out this responsibility.
Thus, the landowners had the right to maintain a mandamus
action to compel the commencement of condemnation pro-
ceedings against their properties, 4 if they could show a direct
and substantial invasion of their property rights.75
Two New York state court cases have explored the issue of
whether the federal government's pervasive control over navi-
gable airspace, as implemented by the FAA clearance zone
regulations, constituted a prior taking of airspace over prop-
erty. Both Kupster Realty Corp. v. State of New York 7 6 and
3775 Genesee Street Inc. v. State of New York," held that
there were no provisions in either the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, or subsequent regulations thereunder, authorizing the
enforcement of a hazard finding against any private land-
owner for construction that might infringe upon navigable air-
space.7 8 Apparently, the judicial interpretation of Congres-
sional intent relative to clearance zone restrictions was that
the limitation is achieved only through voluntary compliance
by the private landowners affected.7 9 Thus, the clearance zone
restrictions per se did not constitute a prior taking, and fur-
ther, any compensation for inverse condemnation must come
from the municipal airport operator and not from a federal
agency like the FAA.80
73 216 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 1974).
11 Id. at 665.
15 Id. at 662.
" 93 Misc. 2d 843, 404 N.Y.S.2d 225 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978).
7 99 Misc. 2d 59, 415 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1979).
78 3775 Genesee Street Inc. v. New York, 415 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1979);
Kupster Realty Corp. v. New York, 404 N.Y.S.2d 225, 230 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978). See 49
U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1501 (1976); 14 C.F.R. § 77 (1981).
71 404 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
60 415 N.Y.S.2d at 579. See Kupster Realty Corp. v. New York, 404 N.Y.S.2d at
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In one California case, San Diego Unified Port District v.
Superior Court (Britt),81 federal preemption of navigable air-
space shielded the airport proprietor from liability for noise-
related damages caused by aircraft in flight. The court, how-
ever, did not allow the Supremacy Clause to be a total um-
brella from liability, but rather ruled that the airport proprie-
tor would not be immune from liability for tortious
mismanagement of the airport and its facilities.2
The California Supreme Court, in Greater Westchester
Homeowners Association v. City of Los Angeles," did not en-
tirely agree with Britt. The court reasoned that there was no
federal immunity for the airport proprietor from tort damage
liability due to excessive airport noise, resulting from either
aircraft in flight or the airport's location and operations." The
city, as the airport operator, was once again held to be mone-
tarily responsible for property damage and personal injury re-
lated to aircraft noise.
A review of the federal and state cases demonstrates that
the judiciary still adheres to the Griggs decision. This adher-
ence to Griggs strongly emphasizes that responsibility for the
consequences of noisy aircraft is with the airport proprietor,
regardless of whether the proprietor is a public entity or a pri-
vate party. The airport proprietor has the authority to control
noise levels through the determination of the airport's loca-
tion, the direction of the runways and therefore the direction
of flight of the aircraft, and through the construction and the
operation of the airport. It is evident that federal plenary
powers in the area of navigable airspace do not shield the air-
port proprietor against legal, and thus financial, responsibility
for damages due to aircraft noise.
231.
1, 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Britt v. San Diego United Port Dist., 434 U.S. 859 (1977).
02 67 Cal. App. 3d at 377, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
s1 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820
(1980).
" 26 Cal. 3d at 99-100, 603 P.2d at 1335-36, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
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II. WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF AIRPORT USE RESTRICTIONS?
Over the years the courts have attempted to define which
governmental or private agency can promulgate noise control
regulations and to what extent. Confrontations in the court-
room abound between various combinations of governmental
entities, whether or not they are airport proprietors, as to the
rights and limitations of those who control, or think they can
control, aircraft noise. The distinction that the courts seem to
have drawn is based on the source of authority for issuing the
regulation, as well as the nature of the regulation or the activ-
ity regulated.
A. Proprietor Airport Use Restrictions
The United States Supreme Court in Griggs5 placed the
primary responsibility for injuries to property caused by air-
craft noise on the local airport proprietor, to the exclusion of
the federal government or the air carriers. Basing their deci-
sion on this judicially determined principle of liability, the
Supreme Court in Burbank" held that the Noise Control Act
of 1972 preempted the City of Burbank's exercise of its police
power 87 in attempting to impose a curfew on the privately
owned airport. The Court also alluded to a letter from the
Secretary of Transportation that discussed the power of the
municipal airport proprietor to issue its own controls." The
Griggs and Burbank decisions clearly imply that, because the
airport proprietor is responsible for the consequences of air-
craft related noise, it should have the requisite authority to
regulate aircraft activity.
The reasoning in Griggs and Burbank is supported by the
rulemakers in their attempt to establish a statutory scheme
for the regulation of aircraft noise. Congress did not intend
the Noise Control Act of 1972 to alter the rights of "[ajirport
owners acting as proprietors [to] deny the use of their airports
88 Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
' Id. at 633.
Id. at 635 n.14.
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to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations . . . ,,9 The
FAA, in its 1976 report entitled "Aviation Noise Abatement
Policy,"90 attempted to define the areas in which the airport
proprietor had authority to implement directly aircraft use re-
strictions, to make proposals to the appropriate local govern-
mental entity, or to request that proposed noise regulations be
reviewed by the FAA and the general public. The airport pro-
prietor is limited, of course, by the constitutional caveats that
these use restrictions must not be unjustly discriminatory or
arbitrary, nor interfere unreasonably with interstate or foreign
commerce, nor impede or interfere with the federal manage-
ment and control of navigable airspace encompassing air
safety and air traffic control. 1 The rulemakers placed the re-
sponsibility on the airport proprietor to control airport noise,
but they declined to guide the proprietor adequately in issu-
ing use restrictions. Consequently, as the following cases will
attest, this gray area is slowly being defined in the courtroom.
British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey92 dealt with the right of the proprietor to regulate
noise exposure at the airport by controlling airport operations.
The federal appellate court held that the proprietor could reg-
ulate airport activities in a nondiscriminatory manner. Evi-
dence showed that the Port Authority had already issued two
nondiscriminatory restrictions: 1) no jets could land at JFK
without prior airport permission; and 2) the noise levels of all
aircraft must not be greater than 112 PNdB (Perceived Noise
Level in decibels).93 Although these were voluntary restric-
tions, in the sense that no sanctions attached to a violation,
89 S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968) (citing with approval excerpt of a
letter from the Secretary of Transportation).
" DOT/FAA Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, supra note 14, at 55-57.
91 43 Fed. Reg. 28,417 (1978).
11 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y.) (Concorde I), rev'd, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), on re-
mand, 437 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.) (Corcorde II), affd as modified, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d
Cir. 1977).
11 437 F. Supp. at 808. The court explained that the perceived noise method of
measuring sound includes not only the physical intensity of the sound, but also its
frequency and duration, and thus, obtains a truer measure of people's psychological
reaction to noise. Id. An explanation of the use of Perceived Noise Level is found in
the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), at 14 C.F.R. §A36.5 (1981).
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they were, nonetheless, an attempt by the proprietor to gov-
ern permissible noise levels of airplanes.
The propriety of a clear attempt to exercise proprietary
power was the subject of litigation in National Aviation v.
City of Hayward.9 4 In Hayward, the city, as the proprietor of
the Hayward Air Terminal, passed an ordinance that prohib-
ited all aircraft exceeding a noise level of 75 dB(A) (a
weighted sound level) from operating at the airport between
the hours of 11:00 pm and 7:00 am. The court found the ordi-
nance valid.9 5 The plaintiff air freight company, National Avi-
ation, argued that this ordinance was a preempted exercise of
the police power and, in addition, that it imposed an imper-
missible burden on interstate commerce. The federal district
court addressed both issues. The court examined the reason-
ing from the Griggs decision and the more recent Crotti hold-
ing, but decided that legislative intent must control in the in-
stant case." Judge Peckham held that, absent a more definite
showing by the FAA and Congress of an intent to preempt
this area, an airport proprietor who is responsible for the air-
port operations has the right to promulgate regulations aimed
at aircraft noise abatement.9 7 Judge Peckham distinguished
the city's ordinance from the one initiated by the City of Bur-
bank.98 He noted that the Hayward ordinance was imposed
and enforced by the City of Hayward as the airport proprie-
tor. The court also noted that the ordinance carried a criminal
penalty of six months in jail and/or a five hundred dollar fine.
This was not sufficient evidence, however, for the court to de-
termine that its promulgation was an exercise of the city's po-
lice power." Judge Peckham characterized the city as wearing
two hats in trying to control airport noise. The city, as the
protector of the health and welfare of the people, used its po-
, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
' Id. at 420-29.
Id. at 424. In Judge Peckham's opinion, it was not Congress' intent to prevent
airport proprietors from excluding any aircraft on the basis of noise considerations.
See S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968).
91 418 F. Supp. at 424.
" Id.
" Id. at 425.
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lice powers in the enactment of the airport curfew, but the
ordinance was adopted by the city in its capacity as the pro-
prietor of Hayward Air Terminal. 00
The court found no evidence to conclude that the Hayward
ordinance would impose an impermissible burden upon inter-
state commerce. The argument that other municipalities may
be tempted to pass similar ordinances and thus together cre-
ate an impermissable burden on interstate commerce, was too
speculative for the court.'0 ' The court viewed the matter of
noise control as one of peculiarly local concern, stating that, if
Congress or the governmental agencies, such as the FAA, want
to preempt this area, they will have to take more definitive
steps to indicate their intention to provide a uniform regula-
tory scheme.102
Meanwhile, in the Midwest, three governmental entities
joined forces to exclude jets from using a general aviation air-
port in the City of Blue Ash, Ohio v. McLucas.05 The City of
Blue Ash, the City of Cincinnati, who owned the airport, and
the Hamilton County Regional Airport Authority, who oper-
ated the airport, tacitly agreed to pass almost identical resolu-
tions prohibiting jet aircraft from using the airport.'04 The
plaintiffs brought this action to compel the FAA to delete a
published notice in the Airman's Information Manual'0 5 that
the airport was closed to jets "not meeting FAR 36 noise lim-
its."' 0 6 Because this notice implied that jets which met FAR
36 noise limits could fly in, the United States Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the case
on legal technicalities. The court noted, however, that the fed-
eral government had preempted the powers of the state and
local governments and their agencies from using their police
100 Id. at 424.
101 Id. at 427.
101 Id. at 424.
103 596 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1979).
10, Id. at 711.
105 The Airmans Information Manual is an FAA informational publication for air-
craft pilots. Id. It provides information on the restrictions and facilities at individual
airports across the country.
106 Id. FAR 36 refers to the noise standards for subsonic jet aircraft published in 14
C.F.R. § 36 (1981).
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powers to control noise by regulating the flight of airplanes.
Yet the federal government had not preempted the right of
the state or local agencies, as proprietors, from establishing
nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory noise level regulations. In
dismissing the case, the court did not address the issue of
whether the tripartite agreement resulted from the exercise of
proprietary power or police power.107
A recent district court case consistent with the policy of lo-
cal proprietary discretion in aircraft noise abatement matters
is the California case of Santa Monica Airport Association v.
City of Santa Monica.108 The City of Santa Monica, as owner/
proprietor of a general aviation airport, passed several ordi-
nances that affected aircraft and airport operations and the
noise levels in the surrounding community. The court, using a
two-prong test of equal protection and interstate commerce,
upheld the constitutionality of all the ordinances, with the ex-
ception of the total restriction on jet aircraft and a related
ordinance imposing a large fine on jet landings or takeoffs.109
Several ordinances adopted by the municipality acted to: (1)
totally restrict aircraft takeoff operations during the week be-
tween the hours of 11:00 pm and 7:00 am; (2) allow helicopter
operations, but ban helicopter pilot training; (3) prohibit
touch and go training operations of propeller aircraft on the
weekends; and (4) impose a noise level restriction of 100
dB(A), as defined by an integrated noise measure called a sin-
gle event noise exposure level (SENEL), and attach a criminal
penalty and a fine for any violation of the noise limit.110
It is interesting to note that Judge Hill, in upholding the
SENEL measure in Santa Monica, rejected the distinction
made in Crotti,1" in which it was decided that the imposition
of a SENEL was an attempt to regulate the noise levels of
107 Id. at 712-13.
481 F. Supp. 927 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
I d. at 935.
"0 Id. at 933-34. A single event noise exposure level (SENEL), in decibels, is the
"noise exposure level of a single event, such as an aircraft flyby, measured over the
time interval between the initial and final times for which the noise levels of a single
event exceeds the threshold noise level." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, R. 5006(d) (1977).
" Air Transport Ass'n v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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aircraft in flight, and thus an interference in "a federally pre-
empted area. 1 2 The two SENEL ordinances were similar in
both cases and contained provisions for criminal penalties. In
Crotti, however, the court took the view that such an ordi-
nance was an unlawful exercise of the state's police powers
because it operated in the exclusive federal domain of naviga-
ble airspace, interstate and foreign commerce.' 8
A comparison can be made between the curfew ordinances
of Santa Monica and the ordinances in another California
United States District Court case, National Aviation v. City
of Hayward.14 Both ordinances limited aircraft operations to
specified hours, but the Hayward restriction was based upon
noise level, while the Santa Monica restriction proscribed the
type of flight operation that could take place. Both courts ex-
amined the effects of their respective ordinances on interstate
commerce, but found the balance in favor of allowing the local
community to control noise levels." 5
Airport proprietors are motivated by social and economic
objectives to place use restrictions on airport and aircraft op-
erations. The dilemma is the desire for a quiet environment,
coupled with the attempt to maintain a viable airport to ser-
vice the transportation needs of the community. If Congres-
sional intent is that airport proprietors may promulgate non-
discriminatory restrictions on airport use, then there must be
more definitive Congressional guidance, through such agencies
as the FAA or CAB, as to what regulations are acceptable.
Otherwise, there is the potential of litigation each time the
proprietor attempts to impose restictions that are perceived to
infringe upon the federally preempted area of navigable
airspace.
B. Non-Proprietor Airport Use Restrictions
The goal of airport use restrictions is to achieve a quiet
1T Id. at 65.
,; Id.
1" National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
, 418 F. Supp. at 428. See also Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa
Monica, 481 F. Supp. 927, 938-40 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
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community environment. The problem is to determine what
public or private agencies can implement use restrictions in
order to carry out this aim. As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, the courts are disposed to allow a municipal airport pro-
prietor to govern airport operations as long as the restrictions
do not abridge constitutionally reserved federal powers.
Courts for the most part, however, perceive an attempt by a
non-proprietary state or local government to restrict airport
operations as a prohibitive exercise of police powers. Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas addressed this issue directly in Burbank11 when
he ruled that non-proprietary restrictions were federally pre-
empted. After this seemingly clear proclamation, however, the
courts, as will be seen in the following cases, are not in accord
regarding non-proprietary airport use restrictions.
In County of Cook v. Priester,11 7 the trial court ruled that
the local county government, non-proprietors, could not at-
tach restrictions dealing with landing and takeoff visual flight
patterns or runway load bearing capacity, as conditions for
granting a special use permit for the construction of a private
airport."' The county appealed from the portion of the trial
court's decision dealing with the runway load bearing capac-
ity. The county argued that it was using its police powers to
protect the safety of the citizens living in the area surround-
ing the airport. The county specifically denied that its special
use permit was in any way motivated by noise considera-
tions." 9 The evidence failed to show that aircraft weight by
itself bore a direct relationship to the safety of the residents.
The Illinois appellate court noted that heavier aircraft were
not necessarily more unsafe, because of the improvements in
aircraft technology.1 20
The next two cases focus on the attempt by one municipal-
ity to control the operations of an airport owned and operated
by another municipality. United States of America v. City of
116 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
17 22 Ill. App. 3d 964, 318 N.E.2d 327 (1974), afl'd, 62 Ill. 2d 357, 342 N.E.2d 41
(1976).
118 318 N.E.2d at 330-31.
119 Id. at 329.
110 Id. at 334.
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New Haven,121 brought an end to the attempts by the City of
East Haven to regulate overflights from an airport owned, op-
erated, and located in the City of New Haven. The City of
East Haven, in an effort to reduce the noise level in its com-
munity by prohibiting the use of an airport runway physically
located in New Haven, threatened to enforce a contempt or-
der if any aircraft operating from this runway flew over the
clear zone at the end of the runway, which lay within the ju-
risdiction of East Haven. 122 The court concluded that Con-
gress had legislated pervasively in this area of navigable air
space. Consequently, state or local provisions conflicting with
these regulations, whether legislatively or judicially inspired,
were invalid, including those of the City of East Haven. 2 '
The court in Township of Hanover v. Town of Morris-
town,24 attempted to reach a compromise in a legal battle be-
tween Morristown, the owner of the airport, and Hanover, the
location of the airport. The citizens of Hanover wanted to
prohibit the physical and operational expansion of the airport.
The lower chancery court did not proscribe the physical ex-
pansion of the airport, but did place some operational restric-
tions on it.125 These restrictions were divisible into those deal-
ing with the navigable airspace and those charactized as
ground operations. Two and a half years after the lower court
entered the judgment to implement these various restrictions,
Morriston, in reliance upon the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Burbank,1 2 6 was granted its motion to va-
cate the part of the original judgment dealing with a preferen-
tial runway scheme and the jet aircraft curfew. The noise
abatement procedures recommended for ground operations,
however, were allowed to stand. It appears from Hanover that
the non-proprietor, Hanover, was able to dictate the noise
"1 367 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Conn. 1973), afl'd, 496 F.2d 452 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 958 (1974).
:" Id. at 1340.
23 Id. at 1341.
... 108 N.J. Super. 461, 261 A.2d 692 (1969), aff'd, 135 N.J. Super. 529, 343 A.2d
792 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
i" 261 A.2d at 707-08.
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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abatement procedures that focused on airport ground
operations.12
California was again the forum of controversy with two
cases that examined the power of the state to restrict aircraft
and airport operations. In Air Transport Association of
America t. Crotti,"' the court reversed the State of Califor-
nia's airport noise regulations. Those regulations were passed
in an effort to achieve a community noise level of 65 dB(A) by
December 31, 1985, in areas adjacent to airports. The first
regulation set a maximum community noise equivalent level
(CNEL)2 9 for a residential community noise exposure level of
65 .dB(A) by December 31, 1985. The second regulation re-
quired the establishment of maximum single event noise ex-
posure levels (SENEL) for aircraft operations at each of the
airports.'3 0 Violations of the SENEL noise limit by an aircraft
operator constituted a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of
one-thousand dollars.' 8'
The Crotti court interpreted Burbank to proscribe the use
of police power but not proprietary control. 3 2 The court rea-
soned that the right to control airport operations necessarily
flows from the airport operator's liability for the consequences
of the airport operations. 8 ' This right of proprietorship con-
trol can be at the airport operator's own initiative or directed
by state police power, and this authority to control is ex-
enipted from federal preemption. The court perceived that lo-
cal airport authorities were political subdivisions of the state,
and as such, the state had the right to reach down and direct
117 See Township of Hanover v. Town of Morriston, 135 N.J. Super. 529, 343 A.2d
792, 796 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
128 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975). See also supra notes 23-26 and accompanying
text.
',, California defines the community noise equivalent level (CNEL) in decibels, as
the "average daytime noise level during a 24-hour day, adjusted to an equivalent level
to account for the lower tolerance of people during evening and night time periods
relative to the daytime period." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, R. 5006(f) (1977).
80 389 F. Supp. at 61-62. For a definition of SENEL, see supra note 110.
... 389 F. Supp. at 62.
"'2 Id. at 64.
131 Id. at 63.
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their activities to some degree.1 34
The question is: To what degree? The court determined
that the state could dictate regulations dealing with airport
ground operations, such as land use planning or shielding of
ground facilities, and the regulation directing the use of
CNEL was not, therefore, per se invalid. The court did not
address the issue of what would happen if the CNEL standard
mandated by the state, as a practical matter, required the air-
port proprietor to restrict the frequency of aircraft operations
or the type of operational activities-an issue which flirts with
controlling air traffic and thus navigable airspace. The court
decided, however, that the enforcement of the noise measure
SENEL invaded this very area of federal preemption and it
characterized the SENEL regulations as indicating state exer-
cise of its police power, as well as interference with aircraft in
direct flight.13 5
In light of this ruling, it is interesting to note the approach
taken in an attempt by the State of California to impose an
extended curfew on commercial airline operations at a munici-
pally operated airport, in San Diego Unified Port District v.
Gianturco." 6 The court held that the state could not direct
the port district, the airport proprietor, to exercise its proprie-
tary powers to abate noise in this manner. This holding seems
to be in direct oppostion to Crotti. In Crotti, the state did not
implement specific directions for the airport proprietor to fol-
low, but rather made suggestions as to the noise abatement
procedures available to the proprietor to achieve the CNEL of
65 dB(A). The court in Gianturco undoubtedly saw the impli-
cation that, if the state were successful in attaching a con-
diton to a use variance, then other agencies of the government
could attach conditions to licenses, permits or variances, and
thus control airport activities.
As shown by the analysis of the previous cases, the courts
have carefully guarded the airport proprietor's authority to
control airport operations. The courts have approved legisla-
"4 Id. at 64.
13 Id. at 65.
"1 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1978).
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tively or judicially imposed restrictions on a very limited ba-
sis, and only in cases where there is no interference in a feder-
ally preempted area. The courts and the federal government
will, in all probability, continue this trend in support of air-
port proprietor-generated regulations. If non-airport proprie-
tors were allowed to enact regulations that restrict airport op-
erations, it might well invite a decline in economic growth for
the airport and the communities served by them. On the other
hand, the rules adopted by airport proprietors appear to be
tempered by the economic interest of maintaining a viable
and profitable airport enterprise. More importantly, if the air-
port proprietors are to be held liable for noise-related dam-
ages, then they should have the regulatory means to promul-
gate noise abatement procedures and possibly decrease the
chances of additonal aircraft noise inspired litigation.
III. LEGAL THEORIES AND TRENDS IN AWARDING DAMAGES
When people in their homes are subjected, on a daily basis,
to the sound of, aircraft takeoffs and landings, they may seek
judicial relief from the noise. Ideally, they would like the
court to issue an injunction and have the aircraft operations
cease and desist. Being realistic, however, the annoyed com-
munity usually realizes that an injunction is not a practical
solution to such a complex problem, and instead seeks mone-
tary relief.
The following analysis of recent court decisions will indicate
that many of the legal theories underlying the causes of action
for aircraft noise damage have expanded. The traditional con-
stitutional theory of inverse condemnation has broadened in
scope, along with the tort theory of nuisance. It is evident
from the cases that the courts are awarding residents near an
airport, who are subjected to excessive noise, monetary relief,
not only for property damages but also for emotional and
mental distress caused by aircraft noise.
A. Inverse Condemnation
Inverse condemnation is the deprivation of private property
by a legal authority, dedicating the property to a public use
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without providing just compensation to the owner. 13 7 The the-
ory involves the use of the airspace in such a manner that
noise levels generated by aircraft cause land values to de-
crease. When the governmental entity fails to follow the ap-
proved legal procedures for acquiring the private property, or
at least an avigation easement with respect to it, then the land
owner traditionally initiates legal action against the public en-
tity to recover the value of the property right that has been
forfeited.
In most federal courts, the property owner must prove there
was a sufficient loss of use and enjoyment of the land to con-
stitute a taking under the fifth amendment.""8 This rule de-
nies recovery for consequential damages in the absence of any
taking. As a result, many states have included in their consti-
tutions a provision which, in substance, provides that private
property shall not be taken or damaged by public use without
compensation."3' The federal obligation, however, has not yet
been enlarged either by statute or by constitutional
amendment.
The federal cases that have dealt with the issue of inverse
condemnation have held that, for a landowner to recover dam-
ages for aircraft generated noise under the theory of inverse
condemnation, the offending aircraft had to fly below a pre-
scribed altitude, directly over the property in question.140 This
position was affirmed in a lower court decision, Batten v.
United States,"" in which the plaintiff was denied recovery
because there were no direct aircraft overflights.'4 2
State court decisions have deviated from the federal trend
by allowing recovery to landowners both under and near the
See generally, 26 AM. Jua. 2D Eminent Domain §§ 153-173 (1966).
See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13 (requiring compensa-
tion where private property is "taken, destroyed or damaged"); WASH. CONsT. art. I, §
16, amend. 9 (refering to a "taking" or "damaging" or private property).
40 Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946).
1 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955, rehearing denied, 372
U.S. 925 (1963).
"I Id. at 583-85.
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flight paths. The courts in Thornburg v. Port of Portland,"s
and Martin v. Port of Seattle,"' acknowledged, but rejected,
the line of federal cases that required direct overflights. The
court in Martin formulated its rejection by saying: "We are
unable to accept the premise that recovery for interference
with the use of land should depend upon anything as irrele-
vant as whether the wing tip of the aircraft passes through
some fraction of an inch of the airspace directly above the
plaintiff's land."" 5
A more recent state decision, Alevizos v. Metropolitan Air-
ports Commission of Minneapolis and St. Paul (MAC)," 6 fol-
lowed this trend and did not require direct aircraft overflight
for plaintiffs to recover damages. The property could be close
to, but not directly under the flight path." 7 The Minnesota
court's interpretation of taking, like that in Thornburg and
Martin, included property adjacent to the flight path. These
holdings were not limited by the federal court decisions in
United States v. Causby" and Griggs v. Allegheny
County."
9
"1 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
.. 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964).
"0 391 P.2d at 545.
146 298 Minn. 471, 216 N.W.2d 651 (1974).
"1 216 N.W.2d at 659.
.4- 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
.4- 369 U.S. 84 (1962). The state courts have interpreted the federal decisions in
Causby and Griggs in two ways in order to achieve their purpose of allowing recovery
to landowners for damages due to airplane noise. Some state courts have noted a
language difference between the state constitutions and the federal constitution. The
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution requires the stricter test of a
"taking" of property, whereas many state constitutions allow compensation when pri-
vate property is "taken, destroyed, or damaged." See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
See also supra note 139.
While courts have recognized the difference in the language in the constitutions,
this difference has not been the determinative factor in granting compensation. In-
stead, a number of state courts have allowed property owners to recover by interpret-
ing the Causby and Griggs cases as allowing recovery based on a nuisance theory. For
example, the court in Thornburg, a case in a state having a constitution with provi-
sions similar to the United States Constitution, held that a compensable taking oc-
curs whenever governmental activity substantially interferes with the useful posses-
sion of property, either by repeated trespasses or by repeated nontrespassory
invasions called nuisances. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100,
106 (1962).
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The court of appeals in a California case, Aaron v. City of
Los Angeles, 50 affirmed the trial court's decision to hold a
municipal airport operator liable for the taking or damaging
of property "where the owner can show a measurable reduc-
tion in market value resulting from the operation of the air-
port in such manner that the noise from aircraft using the air-
port causes a substantial interference with the use and
enjoyment of the property and interference is sufficiently di-
rect and sufficiently peculiar that the owner, if uncompen-
sated, would pay more than his proper share."""1 The court
also stressed there was no reasonable basis for making a legal
distinction between the effects of flyby aircraft and the same
effects of flyover aircraft.152
In order to support the theory of inverse condemnation and
allow the landowner to recover for the deprivation of private
property, it is necessary to show a definite and measurable
diminution of market value in the property. In Adams v.
County of Dade,153 the plaintiffs met their burden of showing
that the operation of the Miami International Airport was "a
direct and substantial invasion of their respective property
rights.'15 4 The plaintiffs, however, failed to demonstrate a
subsequent diminution in property value, because the values
had actually increased due to inflation and the demand for
real property in Dade County.1 55 There was no provision in
the Florida constitution for compensation if the property was
damaged or destroyed. 15  The Florida court, therefore, fol-
lowed the general rule that condemnation can only lie where
there is a taking, and the test of damages in inverse condem-
nation is still the reduction of fair market value.15 7 The court
,s 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122
(1975).
115 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
Id. at 171 n.8.
"' 335 So. 2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1976).
Id. at 595.
"' Id. at 596.
,6" NoIsE REG. REP (BNA) No. 25, at A-11 (April 28, 1975). See FLA. CONST. art. X,
§ 6. Cf. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13 (allowing compensation where private property is
"taken, destroyed, or damaged").
157 NoisE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 25, at A-11 (April 28, 1975).
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held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief.' " The ap-
peals court affirmed the lower court ruling as to the failure of
the homeowners to prove a "taking." The court concluded
that this appellate decision did not preclude them from bring-
ing another inverse condemnation action at some future
date. 15 9
Two New York cases, Kupster Realty Corp. v. State of New
York 6" and 3775 Genesse Street, Inc. v. State of New York,"'
attest to New York's attempt to relieve itself from present
and future liability for property damages due to aircraft noise,
through the formal acquistion of avigation easements. In both
cases the court reasoned that the state acquired, through the
easement, a right to make noise,' 2 but this was a "finite, spe-
cific right, encompassing no more than the noise levels
shown.""' If, in the future, the landowners can prove damages
due to an increase in air traffic and jet usage, they can bring
an action in inverse condemnation and recover for the addi-
tional burden on the avigation easement.' 64
In Highline School District, King County v. Port of Seat-
tle,8 the plaintiff school district, initially brought an action
against the port, as airport proprietor, seeking recovery of
noise-related damages, and claimed inverse condemnation,
nuisance, and trespass.16 6 The state supreme court dismissed
the latter two causes of action, stating inverse condemnation
to be the proper cause of action for loss of property rights in
Washington, because the "evolution of this theory in the air-
port cases has made reliance on traditional tort theories
unnecessary.' 67
'5 335 So. 2d at 596.
159 Id.
'6 93 Misc. 2d 843, 404 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
99 Misc. 2d 59, 415 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
415 N.Y.S.2d at 585. See also Kupster Realty Corp. v. New York, 93 Misc. 2d
843, 404 N.Y.S.2d 225, 234 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
'' 404 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
'' Id. at 236.
'' 87 Wash. 2d 6, 548 P.2d 1085 (1976).
1 Id. at 1086-87.
117 Id. at 1092.
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B. Trespass
Contrary to the holding in Highline School District, the
principles of tort law were recognized in other state courts. 68
The legal theory of trespass is defined as "transgression or of-
fense which damages another person's . . . property." '' In
practical terms, when related to aircraft noise problems, the
debate over trespass has often revolved, as in inverse condem-
nation cases, on the proximity of the airplane to the land in
question. The view in the state courts has been that airplane
noise is the relevant consideration, not the location of the air-
plane over the land.170
In In Re Ramsey,17 1 the appellate court affirmed the trial
court which had concluded that the proper cause of action
was trespass.17 The appellate court held that, when airplanes
stray from their established glide paths and fly directly over
the plaintiff's property, an action lies in trespass and not in
inverse condemnation. 17  The state appellate court distin-
guished Ramsey from the federal cases by noting that the lim-
ited number of aircraft operations in this case would not be
substantial enough to represent the type of taking contem-
plated in Causby and Griggs.
174
C. Nuisance
Another tort theory that has become more accepted in the
last few years, much to the dismay of airport proprietors, is
the theory of nuisance. Briefly, nuisance is a nontresspassory
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoy-
ment of his or her land.1 75 Traditionally, legal actions founded
upon nuisance have only granted relief where there is a de-
" See, e.g., Hub Theatres, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 370 Mass. 153, 346
N.E.2d 371, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 891 (1976) (nuisance); In Re Ramsey, 31 Pa.
Commw. 182, 375 A.2d 886, 888 n.4 (1977) (trespass).
'' BLACK'S LAw DicTiONARY 1347 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
17 See, e.g., Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 216 N.W.2d 651 (Minn.
1974).
171 31 Pa. Commw. 182, 375 A.2d 886 (1977).
17' 375 A.2d at 866-67.
171 Id. at 887.
174 Id. at 889.
I75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS 821D (1979).
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crease in the value of the property rights. Relief has not been
granted for aircraft noise-related effects on the people them-
selves. Courts, however, have broadened the scope of their de-
cisions and interpreted liability for aircraft noise to include
the perceived harm to the mental and emotional well-being of
people.'76
In HUB Theatres, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority,177
the Supreme Court of Massachussetts affirmed a lower court's
decision to dismiss an action brought by plaintiff drive-in the-
atre owners, against the Massachusetts Port Authority, for re-
covery under the tort theory of nuisance for aircraft over-
flights from Logan Interiational Airport.17 8 In this case, a
Massachusetts state statute prohibited this cause of action as
a basis for recovery. 179 The rationale was that a state can pass
a statute allowing certain actions which otherwise would be
considered a nuisance. The court noted, however, that even
though the state statute sanctions certain conduct, it cannot
be construed to allow negligent conduct.1 80 The plaintiff's case
was dismissed for failure to allege that the Port Authority was
conducting the airport activities negligently, or that such ac-
tivities were unreasonable or unnecessary.' 8 ' The Massachu-
setts court recommended that the plaintiffs bring their action
against Logan Airport under a theory of inverse
condemnation.'
In a federal court case, Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe,'"
the plaintiffs brought an action, based on nuisance and consti-
tutional theories, against the FAA as the operator of the air-
port. These two causes of action were employed in an effort to
abate noise from jet aircraft operating from Washington Na-
tional Airport. The citizens' group argued the airlines to be
171 See, e.g., Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. 927
(C.D. Cal.), aff'd, 647 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1979) (opinion withdrawn from publication in
the Federal Reporter at the request of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
77 370 Mass. 153, 346 N.E.2d 371, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 891 (1976).
176 346 N.E.2d at 373.
17, Id. at 373.
16o Id. at 374.
181 Id.
182 Id.
-63 541 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1976).
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the "instrumentality by which the FAA creates a nuisance.""
The nuisance concept was brought under the fifth and ninth
constitutional amendments. It was alleged that the fifth
amendment encompassed the right to be protected from in-
jury to health and that the ninth encompassed the right to
privacy and protection from personal injury. 185 The plaintiffs
were unable to support the allegations with evidence of spe-
cific personal injuries related to noise from the airport, so the
arguments failed.18 The circuit court in Virginians for Dulles
also reasoned that federal laws and regulations have pre-
empted the federal common law of nuisance, in so far as emis-
sions from airplanes are concerned. 187
In San Diego Unified Port Authority District v. Superior
Court, (Britt)"' , the California Court of Appeals concurred
with the spirit of Virginians for Duties by denying recovery
for damages caused by noise from aircraft in flight, because
the federal government controlled the navigable airspace.18'
This action was distinguished, in the court's opinion, from one
allowing recovery from the airport proprietor under a nui-
sance theory for personal and property injuries arising from
tortious mismanagement of the airport itself.190 The court
concluded that if it levied damages for aircraft flight related
noise, thereby permitting local liability, this would be tanta-
mount to state regulation of an area that is within exclusive
federal jurisdiction. 91
The most recent case broadening the scope of an airport
proprietor's liability under a nuisance theory is Greater West-
chester Homeowners' Association v. City of Los Angeles.19 In





' 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557, cert. denied sub nor., Britt v. San
Diego Unified Port Dist., 434 U.S. 859 (1977).
180 67 Cal. App. 3d at 377, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
I" Id.
'' Id.
1n 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
820 (1980).
1982]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
nuisance action against the municipal airport proprietor,
claiming emotional and mental distress caused by excessive
noise, smoke, and vibrations emanating from jet aircraft using
Los Angeles International Airport.193 The court ruled that
federal regulations and laws do not shield the airport proprie-
tor from tort damage liability. Excessive airport noise is a
combination of aircraft operations, location of the runways
and facilities, and noise abatement procedures. These factors
are all advocated and controlled by the airport proprietor,
subject to FAA supervision.194
Under traditional nuisance theory, findings of emotional
distress necessitate a related physical injury."' The trial
court, however, did not base its findings of emotional distress
upon any physical injury, such as hearing loss. Instead, the
court based the amount of recovery upon the plaintiffs' per-
sonal testimony as to the intensity of the effects and duration
of aircraft noise exposure."s6 The ruling also included the ad-
monition that compensation for these past injuries would not
prohibit these same plaintiffs from bringing the same cause of
action for subsequent injuries from the continuing aircraft
nuisance. 19 This rather liberal interpretation of personal in-
jury nuisance law, as it relates to aircraft noise, was a clear
warning to airport operators to take a more affirmative posi-
tion in seeking aircraft noise abatement solutions.
The appellate court also denied the defendant's argument
that the California statute"18 provided the airport with immu-
"I The trial of the direct condemnation and nuisance actions was bifurcated and
substantial direct and inverse condemnation judgments in favor of the plaintiffs were
entered and satisfied. The trial court felt that the plaintiffs had established the exis-
tence of an actionable nuisance which would justify damages and recovery indepen-
dent of plaintiffs' claims for dimunition of their property value. 26 Cal. 3d at 92, 603
P.2d at 1330-31, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
"I Id. at 99, 603 P.2d at 1336, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
"' W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (4th ed. 1971).
" 26 Cal. 3d at 92, 603 P.2d at 1331, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
197 See NoisE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 37, at A-29 (Oct. 6,1975) (discussing the hold-
ing of the trial court in Greater Westchester Homeowners' Ass'n v. City of Los Ange-
les, No. C-931-989 (Cal. Sup. Ct.)).
1 26 Cal. 3d at 93, 603 P.2d at 1331, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 735 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE §
3482 (West 1970)). This California statute provides: "Nothing which is done or main-
tained under the express authority of a state can be deemed a nuisance."
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nity from nuisance liability. The defendant city argued that
aircraft operations are expressly sanctioned by statutory law
which provides, in effect, that "nothing which is done or
maintained under the express authority of a statute can be
deemed a nuisance."' 99 The California Supreme Court con-
cluded that the statutory sanction plea was unavailable to the
municipal airport proprietor concerning acts which, by their
very nature, constitute a nuisance.200 These acts, according to
the supreme court, must be expressly authorized by the stat-
ute to insure that the legislature intended to sanction a nui-
sance. In other words, while the statute designates the use of
the runways for aircraft, it does not expressly authorize the
excessive noise levels of the aircraft on the runways.201
The decisions holding an airport proprietor liable for air-
craft noise-related damages have increased in number and in
scope. From the earlier cases requiring direct aircraft over-
flights, 02 to ones allowing adjacent flybys,208 to the Greater
Westchester2 0 4 ruling allowing recovery for noise-related emo-
tional distress, it is easy to see that the airport proprietors
have more than a casual concern with their increasing suscep-
tibility to liability.
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF LAND USE PLANNING AND
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS
A. Effectiveness of Land Use Planning In Airport Noise
Control
While it seems that the federal government has preempted
a major portion of the area dealing with aircraft noise control,
it is important to recognize those aspects over which the fed-
eral government has not assumed jurisdiction. The United
States Constitution has delegated to the state and local gov-
Id.
' 26 Cal. 3d at 101, 603 P.2d at 1336-37, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 740.
201 Id.
s0, See, e.g., Griggs v, Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 798 (1946). See also supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
103 See, e.g., Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 216 N.W.2d 651 (Minn.
1974). See also supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
104 603 P.2d 1329 (Cal. 1979). See supra notes 183-91.
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ernments the traditional responsibility for the health, welfare,
and safety of their citizens. 08 This responsibility implies the
following powers: to control local zoning; to acquire an inter-
est in the land through easements, including avigational ease-
ments; to develop compatible land use guidelines; to exact
building codes; or to determine airport locations. The follow-
ing cases exemplify the efforts of various local authorities to
implement concepts associated with developing a noise control
plan.
Two decisions in New Jersey held that the federal govern-
ment does not preempt state or local governmental authority
in determing the location of a private heliport.'" The federal
legislation contemplated that state or local governments
should retain the power to regulate ground activites not di-
rectly involving aircraft operations.07 In both cases, Garden
State Farms, Inc. v. Bay IP08 and Application of Ronson
Corp.,'"' the court advised the State Commissioner of Trans-
portation that, while he had discretionary power to determine
the location of the heliport, he should consider the local inter-
ests and recognize that local zoning ordinances are important
in selecting an aviation facility location which is compatible
with the surrounding land uses. 10
Local municipalities can use their zoning powers to prohibit
the construction of an airport or to determine the type of
compatible land use in the areas adjacent to the airport. An
Illinois case, Wright v. County of Winnebago,11 provides an
example of an attempt by the county to prevent construction
of a private airport. The court dismissed the case for other
306 U.S. Const. amend. V.
2" Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay II, 136 N.J. Super. 1, 343 A.2d 832 (1975),
rev'd, 146 N.J. Super. 438, 370 A.2d 37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.), modified and afl'd, 77
N.J. 439, 390 A.2d 1177 (1978); Application of Ronson Corp., 164 N.J. Super. 68, 395
A.2d 866 (1978).
'o0 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1301 (1976)).
206 390 A.2d 1177 (1978).
2- 395 A.2d 866 (1978).
110 Garden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay, II, 77 N.J. 439, 390 A.2d 1177, 1185 (1978);
Application of Ronson Corp., 146 N.J. Super. 68, 395 A.2d 866, 868 (1978).
2-1 391 N.E.2d 772 (Ill. 1979).
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reasons, but held that the county could zone on the basis of
aircraft noise, because "the FAA does not preempt local, or
state power to decide whether to allow new private airports on
the basis of potential noise problems. '2 12
In LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook,213 the munici-
palities used zoning powers to restrict the property near air-
ports to nonresidential use. The plaintiff in LaSalle sought a
zoning change from manufacturing to multiple family residen-
tial, but the appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision
to uphold the' validity of the county ordinance which re-
stricted building height.21 ' The court reasoned that this was a
proper exercise of the police power because there was an ap-
propriate need, due to increased air traffic, to protect the pub-
lic from air hazards.1 8 Further, because the land could still be
used for industrial development, this ordinance did not create
an avigation easement amounting to a taking of private land
for public use without just compensation.2 1
The local governmental authority or the airport commission
can acquire an interest in the land adjacent to an airport by
formally imposing a height restriction and taking an avigation
easement.1 If the airport commission has the power to take
avigational easements in order to operate the airport, 1 it can
also be compelled to acquire an avigation easement for com-
pensation through inverse condemnation actions, if the air-
craft overflights are of such magnitude as to directly and sub-
stantially invade property rights.21
In order for an airport and its immediate community to co-
exist, the airport operator, local municipality, and the state
government must take affirmative action in developing a via-
ble noise control/land use compatibility plan. The federal gov-
212 Id. at 778.
1, 34 Il1. App. 3d 264, 340 N.E.2d 79 (1975).
24 340 N.E.2d at 92.
:11 Id. at 89.
, Id. at 88-89.
See, e.g., 3775 Genesee Street, Inc. v. New York, 415 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Ct. Cl.
1979); Kupster Realty Corp. v. New York, 93 Misc. 2d 843, 404 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Ct. Cl.
1978). See also supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
:16 See Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airport Comm'n, 216 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 1974).
219 216 N.W.2d at 662.
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ernment will not infringe upon local or state. government at-
tempts to rezone the land, acquire air easements, impose
building codes or height restrictions, or locate an airport, if it
is pursuant to a legitimate state interest in protecting the
health, welfare, and safety of its citizens.
B. The Effectiveness of an Environmental Impact
Statement In Airport Noise Control
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),"0°
includes the requirement that an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) be prepared for all major federal actions that may
significantly affect the quality of the environment.2 21 It must
contain detailed plans of the project, and a forecast of the
possible environmental consequences, as well as feasible pro-
ject alternatives.2  NEPA is aimed at requiring federal offi-
cials, not private parties, to regulate their activities in compli-
ance with certain procedures or goals as defined by Congress.
Some states have passed similar statutes requiring an environ-
mental impact report (EIR) whenever a project is contem-
plated that could conceivably affect the environment."3 Often
federal or state governmental agencies, such as FAA and CAB
or government officials, are named as parties in litigation
seeking to halt airport expansion by alleging failure on the
part of the agency to prepare an EIS, or if one has been filed,
then by alleging inadequacy in the report's preparation."4
The requirement that an EIS be prepared is not limited to
the inception of a totally new project. If there is a possible
effect on the environment due to the contemplated initiation
of a major federal action involving an on-going project, then
an EIS would also be required."5 In a United States District
Court case in Illinois, State of Illinois v. Butterfield,"i 2 the
i 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4326 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976).
222 Id.
233 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 22002.1, 21061 (West 1977 & Supp. 1982);
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, R. 15000-15203 (1978).
21, See infra notes 226-38 and accompanying text.
225 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
"" 396 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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former FAA administrator, Alexander Butterfield, and the
FAA regional administrator, John Cyrocki, were charged with
failure to prepare an EIS as required by NEPA2 27 The suit
dealt with the increase of aircraft operations and the accom-
panying noise and air pollution at Chicago's O'Hare Interna-
tional Airport. The federal agencies of FAA and CAB were
charged with implementing several actions, such as approved
installation of equipment, which resulted in enlarging the air-
port's capacity to handle more aircraft.2 28 The court deter-
mined that this substantial increase, at an already very busy
airport, was adequate evidence to indicate the need for an
EIS, and compelled the FAA and CAB to prepare one before
continuing to increase air traffic and operations at O'Hare.229
The FAA in Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe2 30 argued that
no EIS was necessary for the two federally operated and
owned airports because there was no major federal action
planned within the meaning of NEPA.23 1 The United States
District Court, however, found that there was a substantial in-
crease in the population near the airport and a growing num-
ber of aircraft operations. There was also an indication in the
federal budget that a modernization of Washington National
Airport was contemplated in the near future. This fact was
enough to support the need for the FAA to perform an EIS
study before initiating any further airport expansion.2
Some construction projects are joint ventures, undertaken
by the state and federal government. In City of Romulus v.
County of Wayne,8 the city and the school board of Romu-
lus wanted to halt the construction of a third parallel runway
at Wayne County Airport, or, at least, prevent the use of fed-
eral funding until an adequate EIS had been prepared. The
FAA had initially prepared an EIS study, but the district
court found that the statement lacked a great deal of informa-
:27 Id. at 635-36.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 646.
220 541 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1976).
31 Id. at 445.
222 Id. at 446-47.
233 392 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Mich. 1975), vacated, 634 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1980).
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tion regarding the impact of the proposed runway on the envi-
ronment.28 The court could not stop the construction of the
entire project, because the project was not solely federal, but
it did enjoin further federal funding until the EIS met the
NEPA requirements.235 The federal defendants then supple-
mented the environmental impact statement, and the district
court dissolved the injunction2 "
Over the years, state and federal agencies have learned from
experience that it is more efficient to perform an acceptable
EIS at the beginning of a project, than risk jeopardizing the
project or incurring unanticipated expenditures after it is un-
derway. Thus, since 1975, few cases concerned with airport ex-
pansion have dealt with the failure to perform an EIS, or the
inadequacy of an EIS. When they do, however, as in the Luke
Air Force Base case, Westside Property Owners v. Schles-
inger,237 the court will probably find that the federal govern-
ment has done an admirable job in considering the environ-
mental effects and balancing the reasonable alternatives.235
AIRPORT NOISE LITIGATION: CASE LAW IMPLICATIONS
This article's extensive review of the relevant judicial deci-
sions on aircraft noise litigation indicates that the courts con-
tinue to hold airport proprietors liable for damages resulting
from aircraft noise. At the same time, the judiciary is ex-
panding the legal theories associated with noise litigation and
is granting recovery for noise-related effects on people under a
, Id. at 586-89.
"' Id. at 595-96. The record did not allow the court to enjoin the entire project
because 50 percent of the funds were local, not federal, and therefore, were not sub-
ject to NEPA requirements. Id. at 596.
236 634 F.2d at 348. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's dissolution order,
arguing that the revised EIS was still inadequate and that the government failed to
reevaluate the project after drafting the addendum. During the time this appeal was
pending, the runway had been completed and the plaintiff's argument that the dis-
trict court erred in dissolving the preliminary injunction and permitting the runway
construction to continue was moot. Pending a decision on the merits, the appellate
court vacated the order of the district court granting and dissolving the injunction
preventing construction of the runway. This case was then remanded to the district
court for further proceedings on any remaining issues. Id. at 349.
:37 415 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Ariz. 1976), affd, 597 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 1304.
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nuisance theory for emotional distress, as well as under the
traditional inverse condemnation theory for deprivation of
property. As a result of this increase in potential liability, air-
port proprietors and municipality non-proprietors, with or
without federal guidance, are implementing airport use re-
strictions, in an attempt to decrease objectionable noise levels
and avoid possible lawsuits. Due to the lack of definitive fed-
eral direction in these regulatory matters, the courts have
been forced into the position of rulemakers to determine, on a
case by case basis, how close the use restrictions come to en-
croaching upon an area historically perceived to be federally
preempted.
In an effort to avoid aircraft noise exposure problems before
they arise, municipalities and airport operators with land ac-
quisition power, are purchasing land, rezoning, or acquiring
avigation easements in the communities adjacent to the air-
ports. Finally, federal or state controlled agencies have
learned to accommodate the requirements for the preparation
of adequate environmental impact statements and reports
when they undertake projects that could conceivably influence
the environment.
Judicial history from Griggs in 1962 to Greater Westchester
in 1980 has consistently placed liability for aircraft noise ef-
fects experienced by property owners squarely on the airport
proprietor. The federal government, unless acting as an air-
port proprietor, has been absolved from financial responsibil-
ity for airport related noise problems. The courts, up to this
point, have not been persuaded by the arguments of airport
proprietors that the federal government, through its agencies
such as FAA or CAB, and accompanying federal laws and reg-
ulations, have so totally controlled air commerce that it
should be the legally responsible party in a lawsuit for noise
damages.
The FAA's position, as implied in the "Aviation Noise
Abatement Policy" of November 1976,' is to avoid complete
federal preemption of the field of aviation noise abatement.
"I See DOT/FAA Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, supra note 14.
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The federal government perceives that the control and reduc-
tion of airport noise should remain a mutual responsibility of
airport proprietors, users, and the government. In the FAA
Notice of Air Transport Association Petition for Rulemaking
on Airport Noise Abatement,24 however, the Air Transport
Association (ATA) attempted to calm the FAA's apparent
fears of financial liability, and reasoned that federal preemp-
tion could co-exist, under the concept of shared* responsibility
with the airport proprietors, and still not impose financial lia-
bility on the federal government.24 1
Traditionally, the landowner had to prove that aircraft flew
directly over the property at a specified minimal altitude and
with such frequency as to constitute a taking of the property
by depriving the owner of substantial use and enjoyment.
This was the classic rubric derived from the salient federal
cases in the field, Causby 42  and Griggs2"8 Times have
changed, however, and state courts will consider awarding
damages under inverse condemnation for aircraft noise gener-
ated from flybys adjacent to the property boundary lines, as
well as for direct overflights. The state courts have interpreted
state constitutional concepts of inverse condemnation to in-
clude the taking and damaging of property by aircraft noise.
Thus, a landowner can be awarded damages for aircraft noise,
even though the property is not directly under the flight path,
if there is a taking or damaging of the property resulting in a
diminution of market value.
Some state courts have allowed recovery under the civil tort
theory of nuisance, which includes property and personal in-
jury. In Great Westchester, " the trial court considered emo-
tional distress to be a compensable injury, and awarded the
plaintiff homeowners damages caused, according to the court,
by "a loss to the homeowner of the use and enjoyment of his
home which results in his annoyance, discomfort, mental or
140 44 Fed. Reg. 52,076 (1979).
141 Id. at 52,077-78.
,41 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
"' Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).




The court, in Great Westchester, made another statement
that could herald the financial facts of life for the airport pro-
prietor's future. The judge ruled that the injured plaintiffs
could bring suit again, at some later date, for damages from
continuing emotional and mental distress attributable to air-
craft noise.2 6 If the airport operators are faced with this ex-
pensive prospect, they are left with no choice but to try and
attenuate objectionable noise levels before they find them-
selves again in' front of the magistrate.
While the airport has an economic incentive to abate the
noise levels, the necessary authority to achieve this goal is
limited by the federal plenary powers over interstate com-
merce and navigable airspace. The "Aviation Noise Abate-
ment Policy," published by the FAA/Department of Trans-
portation in 1976, stated that the FAA would "review and
advise" the airport operator as to the acceptability of any op-
erational use restrictions that the airport proprietors might
want to impose.247 The FAA declined an invitation, however,
to "review and advise," the San Diego Port District in a dis-
pute with the State of California over whether to extend a
curfew. 48 If the federal government fails specifically to iden-
tify, through legislation or in an advisory capacity, acceptable
use restrictions, and the airport operators continue to promul-
gate their own regulations in an effort to reduce financial and
noise exposure levels, then courts are left with the task of
bringing some order to this confusion.
Aviation noise case law indicates that airport operators will
not limit the proprietary use restrictions to airport ground op-
erations alone. The number and type of regulations imposed
on airport users at the city-operated Santa Monica airport is a
prime example of how far a municipal airport proprietor is
willing to challenge federal preemptory powers. The United
Us NOISE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 37, at A-30 (Oct. 6, 1975) (quoting Greater West-
chester Homeowners' Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, No. C-931-989 (Cal. Sup. Ct.)).
'4 NOISE REc.. REP. No. 37, AT A-29 (OcT. 6, 1975).
U7 DOT/FAA Aviation Noise Abatement Policy, supra note 14, at 58-60.
Us San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1978).
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States District Court upheld all the restrictions, with the ex-
ception of the jet ban, on constitutional grounds. 2 9"
The court ruled that Santa Monica's use restrictions were
nondiscriminatory and did not impose an undue burden upon
interstate commerce.2 50 The fact that Santa Monica is a small
general aviation airport undoubtly influenced the court in its
finding that even the completely exclusionary nighttime cur-
few would pose only an incidental burden upon interstate
commerce.
Santa Monica is the most recent in a line of cases 51 in
which the courts applaud the airport's use restrictions,
promulgated in an effort to alleviate the noise problems. The
opinion in Crotti indicated that an airport proprietor had the
right to determine the type of air service, the type of aircraft,
and the permissible noise levels for the aircraft using its facili-
ties.2 2 If this is an indication of the direction of future judi-
cial reasoning when courts are ultimately confronted with
other proprietor imposed use restrictions, then it is not incon-
ceivable that several airports across the country could insti-
tute curfews specifying different time intervals for aircraft op-
erations. Additionally, airports could promulgate different
noise level related curfews, similar to the curfew in Hayward,
that excludes aircraft with certain noise levels from operating
during specified hours.2 5 If this occurred at enough airports
across the country, the impact upon interstate commerce
would not be "too speculative," 25 but would indeed introduce
further chaos into the air commerce system.
The area of aviation noise abatement, for obvious reasons,
is one that needs a system of uniform regulations. State and
local governments, in an effort to protect the health and wel-
u' Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. 927 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), af'd, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981) (opinion withdrawn from publication in
the Federal Reporter at the request of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
481 F. Supp. at 928.
National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Air
Transp. Ass'n of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
"' 389 F. Supp. at 64.
418 F. Supp. at 418.
Id. at 428.
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fare of their citizens, often impose use restrictions on airports
when existing zoning ordinances are not effective in control-
ling the noise exposure levels. In the opinion of this author,
Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown25 indicated that
a municipality that was not an airport proprietor may impose
restrictions dealing with ground operations, such as noise bar-
riers, or limitation of engine testing to certain hours.25" Realis-
tically, in light of Burbank,'2 7 the courts would not be dis-
posed to allow the municipality, as a non-operator, to control
aircraft flight operations.
The municipality does, however, have powers not pre-
empted by the federal government to provide for a quieter en-
vironment through land use planning. The case law indicates
that state or local governmental authorities can use their zon-
ing powers to determine whether the areas adjacent to air-
ports will be open air buffer zones or will be developed for
non-residental use.2 58
The private airport operator can acquire an interest in the
land adjacent to an airport through air easements, but cannot
rezone the land to prohibit residential development in the vi-
cinity of the airport. The private airport operator has limited
ability to control the land adjacent to the airport unless the
municipility that is impacted by the airport will cooperate.
While Burbank Airport, at one time, might have been the only
privately owned and operated commercial airport in the coun-
try, there are currently many instances in which commercial
airports are located within the jurisdiction of one city, but op-
erated under the authority of *another. For example, Ontario
Airport, which is located in San Bernardino County, is oper-
ated by the Los Angeles Department of Airports. Under such
circumstances, it would be beneficial for the airport proprietor
to have a specific contractual agreement with the landlerd
municipality that would assure the airport proprietor of
: 343 A.2d 792 (N.J. Super. 1975).
861 Id. at 796.
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
"8 LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 34 111. App. 3d 264, 340 N.E.2d 79
(1975).
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enough control over adjacent land to prevent residential de-
velopment up to the edge of the runways.
This area of land use planning is also ripe for federal gui-
dance in terms of uniform regulations. Some airports, such as
New York's Westchester County Airport, are physically lo-
cated in, or impact, more than one municipality, or even more
than one state, each with different zoning regulations. More-
over, some states have no established zoning practices. The
federal government, throughout its many funding programs,
could provide incentives for the municipality and the state,
such as under the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone
(AICUZ) policies" 9 to instigate land use programs and zoning
regulations that would take into consideration the impact of
an airport on the community, and would either acquire the
land or rezone it, in an effort to avoid paying damages in a
court of law.
The fundamental issues litigated over the years have not
changed and are a reflection of the federal government's ap-
parent fear that financial liability for airport noise damage
may attach if there is a federally inspired uniform system of
regulations in the field of aviation noise control. If the federal
government abdicates its responsibility in this area, then it
falls to the courts to attempt, on a case by case assessment, to
define the airport proprietor's authority in determining rea-
sonable means to control aircraft noise.
" 32 C.F.R. § 256 (1981). The Air Installation Compatible Use Zone (AICUZ) poli-
cies contained in Part 256 emphasize measures to reduce or control noise from flight
and flight-related activities. There are also provisions for land acquisition within the
defined compatible use area. Since land use compatibility is the primary objective of
the AICUZ studies, Part 256.8 provides guidance as to specific land uses and whether
each land use is compatible with the proposed existing airport or airport activities.
Id.
